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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented at the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University 
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I. Major problems in the functioning of the EC foreign 
relations.
The Treaty of Rome does not contain a separate chapter on
external relations.1 2̂ The complex of provisions relating to
foreign relations can hardly be said to belong to the most
2)successfully drafted parts of the Treaty. Yet the external 
competence of the Community concerns the very life nerve of 
the Community's legal system.
The provisions are scattered all over the Treaty and can 
only be fitted into a coherent system with some intellectual 
efforts. Such efforts have been deployed first and foremost 
by the European Court of Justice which through the ERTA-case 
introduced some coherence and consistency into the field of 
foreign relations, in the first place with regard to the 
extent of Community competence. The ERTA-judgement is the 
basis for the doctrine of parallelism whereby treaty making 
power would be co-extensive with the excercise of internal 
competences in any given field even without an explicit 
treaty-making authority in the Treaties.
This case was considered controversial in many quarters, but 
the Court hardly had any choice. It could not have rendered 
a "non liquet". Subsequently, the Court continued to fill in 
the gaps left by the Treaty in cases like the Kramer-case 
(3,4 and 6/76) and opinion 1/76 concerning a draft agreement
1) The ECSC and Euratom treaties do contain such chapters 
but the relevant provisions have had little significance 
and will not be dealt with further in this paper. For a 
more complete analysis of the EEC external relations see 
J. Megret "Le droit de la Communauté économique euro­
péenne, Vol 12 Relations Extérieures".
2) Art 228 states somewhat pompously that "where this Treaty 
provides for the conclusion of agreements between the 
Community and one or more States etc." - However, the 
Treaty provides for only two or three types of such 





























































































In the context of the present paper entitled "The Foreign 
Relations Powers and Policy in the Draft Treaty establishing 
the European Union" the term "Policy" is to mean areas in 
which the Union possesses international relations powers. 
Indeed, the actual concrete policies to be pursued by the 
Union in the various fields of foreign relations are to be 
determined by the competent institutions of the Union at the 
relevant moment. Thus, I shall not dwell on the kind and 
contents of commercial policy, development aid policy etc. 
to be conducted by the Union.
This definition seems to be in harmony with the general ap­
proach reflected in the Draft Treaty, i.e. an institutional 
rather than a functional approach.
For similar reasons the present study will mainly focus on 
the foreign relations machinery in the broad sense of the 
term. Will the machinery set up by the Draft work according 
to the underlying intentions? This approach will perhaps 
facilitate the task to analyze and judge the relevant parts 
and provisions on their own merits, irrespective of the 
rather widespread doubt whether at all at this moment a new 
treaty is the best way to set about achieving greater Euro­
pean unity. It is not for us to answer this question as such 
in the present context. However, our critical remarks may in 
certain respects amount to questions as to whether a Draft 
Treaty following an institutional approach is adequate to 
solve the problems of the unsatisfactory functioning of the 
Community inter alia in the field of foreign relations.
At the same time it must be recognized that the present 
Draft Treaty offers an excellent basis for discussing a 
coherent foreign relations system of a European Union. May 
the following comments be perceived in the same constructive 




























































































establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway
vessels.
ns o 1 0
The Court's own words in this Opinion are illustrative.
After stating that "the power of the Community to conclude 
such an agreement is not expressly laid down in the Treaty" 
The Court continues by saying that "authority to enter into 
international commitments may not only arise from an express 
attribution by the Treaty, but equally may flow implicitly
, Jfrom its provisions" 3 if T
The Court concluded that wherever Community law has created 
for the institutions of the Community powers within its in­
ternal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objec­
tive, the Community has authority to enter into the inter­
national commitments necessary for the attainment of that 
objective even in the absence of an express provision in 
that connection.
By this addition the Court went beyond the scope of the 
ERTA-doctrine opening new avenues for external Community 
competence but generating, simultaneously, further contro-
-IH JII  : • • . •" i £ 9 3 :  » £  W  ■ +• ■ - i n sversy.
The reference to "necessary etc." is surprisingly similar to
the language of art 235 which in an obiter dicta in the 
ERTA-case was also recognized as a legal basis for conclu­
ding Community agreements - and used in practice, in parti­
cular in the field of environment protection. (It also evo­
kes the language of the Copenhagen Report of 1973 para 11 jsiho 
which states that Governments will consult on all important 
foreign policy questions provided, inter alia, the subjects 
concern European interests where the adoption of a common 
position is necessary or desirable).
rd
’ If«
Both under the 1/76-doctrine and art 235 the problem arises 





























































































unlimited discretion to the competent institutions, in par­
ticular the Council, or whether it is rather a legal prin­
ciple leaving a right of censorship to the Court.
Even in the area where the Treaty provides expressly for 
Community competence, i.e. commercial policy under art 113, 
problems arose as to the interpretation of this concept, see 
Opinions 1/75 and 1/78.
These opinions constitute, together with the ERTA-judgement, 
the leading cases in regard to the exclusive character of 
Community competence. The severe peremptory approach in Opi­
nion 1/75 was somewhat mitigated in Opinion 1/78 (The Rubber 
Agreement) demonstrating the conflict between legal ortho­
doxy and political reality.
The 1970ies were characterized by a dynamic development of 
establishing international relations and by a progressive 
assertion of Community power in respect of treaties. In 
practice the Community lawyers were often faced with the 
problem of determining whether the Community was competent 
to conclude agreements with third countries where the poli­
tical need for such action was felt. Or rather, the Commu­
nity had to respond to a series of external challenges in 
new fields such as environment protection, fisheries, deve­
lopment aid, transport and even in the classical area of 
commercial policy. The doctrines were refined? already then 
the notions of exclusive, concurrent and potential compe­
tence together with the concept of mixed agreements were 
emerging.
However, by the end of the 1970ies the problem was not so 
much the determination of the legal parameters of Community 
external competence but rather the reluctance by the Com­





























































































The conflict lies between on the one hand the Commission, 
having obtained the support of the Court for a wide inter­
pretation of Community powers, and on the other hand the 
Council and/or individual Member States reluctant to sur­
render their powers in the field of external relations and 
accept Community competence. Experience has shown that even 
if they do accept Community action in a certain field they 
are sometimes very hesitant, in the event, to allow finan­
cing such action through the Community budget (Rubber Agree­
ment Opinion 1/78).
The problem is not only of an internal nature. The attitude 
of third states has also been an important element in the 
process of mounting the Community as an actor on the inter­
national scene. Two trends seem to be noteworthy:
Certain third states have not been prepared to recognize the 
legal capacity of the Community under international law. In 
particular the USSR and Eastern European Countries have for 
a long time maintained such a negative attitude. This factor 
has contributed to the difficulties of conducting a common 
commercial policy. The Council decision of 22 July 1974 
introducing a procedure of consultation relating to economic 
cooperation agreement still to be negotiated on a bilateral 
basis illustrates this difficulty.
In recent years the Eastern bloc altitude has softened in 
certain respects, in particular in certain multilateral 
fora. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
which allows for Community participation, provides a good 
example.
Conversely, in other situations practice has shown that 
third countries tend increasingly to regard the Member Sta­
tes and the Community as a unity, often more than the Member 




























































































entity on international issues. The difficulties to respond 
to such expectations have manifested themselves in two 
related respects:
Experience has shown that subjects for international nego­
tiations, in particular in multilateral fora, rarely fit the 
structure of the EC-treaties. Even in economic fields the 
subject may often involve matters under Community competence 
as well as under Member States competence. In fact, there 
may be a sliding scale from exclusive Community competence, 
potential competence, art 116-matters and Member States Com­
petence. In such cases resort has been made to "mixed 
agreements".
In other instances, deliberations among the Ten within Euro­
pean Political Cooperation (EPC) have lead to political 
decisions which required the intervention of the Community 
for their implementation.
EPC-discussions on political aspects of proposals concerning 
economic aid to third countries provide clear examples, f. 
inst. food aid to Poland and economic assistance to Central 
America. Other cases show that the present distinction be­
tween EPC and Community creates difficulties even if the 
political will to carry out international action is mani­
fest. Thus the decisions on economic measures ("sanctions") 
against Iran, the USSR and Argentina were taken within EPC. 
The decisions were in certain cases implemented by Community 
measures (f.inst. first phases of USSR sanctions), in other 
instances by the Member States according to national legis­
lation (Iran). ^
3) The later phases of sanctions against USSR and the Ar- 
gentina-case revealed fundamental difficulties due to a 





























































































Conversely, economic cooperation within a Community fra­
mework may open the door for political cooperation. Rela­
tions with the ASEAN-countries provide a good example.
The CSCE, the Euro-Arab dialogue and in particular the UN 
Law of the Sea Conference are examples where Community 
action and Political Cooperation go rather successfully hand 
in hand.
In fact, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between the Ten acting in Political Cooperation and the 
Community. The picture becomes even more blurred when 
account is taken of fields of cooperation among the Ten 
which progressively have moved away from EPC proper and 
established their own framework such as Trevi and "espace 
judiciaire". Both areas deal with relations among the Ten 
rather than with relations between the Ten and third 
countries.
It may be argued that the difficulties encountered when 
responding to one or the other kind of a "mixed" situation 
are due to the "old-fashioned" and "inadeguate" structure of 
the Community and that a simple restructuration of the 
institutional framework would serve to overcome these dif­
ficulties. However, it is impossible to reconstruct history. 
It may, indeed, equally be argued that the increased engage­
ment of the Community/the Ten would never have taken place 
without the present structure which has allowed for a gra­
dual and flexible evolution of powers according to needs. In 
particular, this would not have happened in the absence of a 
distinction between Community and EPC. It is at least note­
worthy that some Member States weighing the pro's of Com­
munity action against the con's of surrendering powers in 
the external field have been willing to give certain con­
cessions along the road. Ministers have grown out of the 




























































































the legal distinction between Community and EPC-affairs. 
However, some of them at least seem very reluctant to give 
up the fundamental bastion i.e. that decisions within EPC as 
a matter of principle are taken by uanimity.
Even if the Council and the Member States have been prepared 
to accept the evolution of Community competences, also in 
new areas not foreseen by the fathers of the Treaty of Rome, 
they have not always been willing to draw all the consequen­
ces, in particular in matters of procedure of negotiation.
The present negotiation regime has evolved through practice, 
inspired largely by art. 113 procedures and by international 
state practice. The legal principles defended in particular 
by the Commission have been in constant clash with socalled 
political realities.
The difficulties reside mainly in the fact that the articles 
of the Treaty (other than article 113), which according to 
the Court provide a legal basis for external action as well 
have not been drafted for such application. The present pic­
ture is multi-faceted and sometimes confusing like a mirror- 
room. Among the main questions which still give rise to 
difficulties are the following.
In practice the Commission always asks the Council for prior 
"authorization" to negotiate agreements also in areas out­
side art. 113, which is the only provision stipulating this 
requirement. This practice is contested by some authors, but 
seems to meet with Commission acquiescence. Another open 
question is to what extent the Commission may entertain 
prior contacts with third countries.
The nature of the decision of the Council authorizing nego­
tiations has also been questioned. The present doctrine 




























































































step in a long process which - as distinct from the process 
of internal law making - involves one or more third parties. 
Hence, it has been generally felt that a certain number of 
special factors should be taken into account when applying 
the system of the Treaty in practice to the process of 
international law-making.
Agreements on protection of the environment and fisheries 
agreements are concluded on the basis of art 235 and art 43 
respectively. Both provisions require consultation of the 
European Parliament. At what stage of the process should 
consultations take place? In practice Parliament is con­
sulted when the agreement has been signed. Certain informal 
procedures serve to ensure that Parliament is kept informed 
during the negotiation process. Recently, a parliamentary 
request has been made for information already from the stage 
where draft directives are being elaborated by the Commis­
sion. The question is how such requests can be reconciled 
with the vital need for confidentiality in international 
negotiations.
According to article 228 of the Treaty the Commission is the 
Community negotiator. Para 1 of this article provides a 
clear, general rule. However, it is among those which are 
most frequently violated in practice. Often the Commission 
has to share its negotiator task with the Council presi­
dency, even in cases where a "mixed" solution is not neces­
sarily called for.
The co-participation of the presidency is not always the 
result of wishes from the Council and Member States. It may 
be necessary in negotiations with third countries which 
still have reservations about the Community as an interna­
tional actor. In other situations, it has been felt useful 




























































































However, in general the two-headed delegation formula serves 
to make Community negotiations very complicated. Further 
complications may arise when individual Member States insist 
to speak as well.
The Proba 20-formula is the expression of a practical solu­
tion to problems of an internal and external nature. In some 
respects it is not in conform ty with the Treaty system 
(recognizing mixity where there is obviously no legal need). 
In other respects it has brought practice closer to the 
Treaty by recognizing an increased negotiator role for the 
Commission.
Negotiations are, as a rule, monitored directly or indirect­
ly by a group or committee composed of Member States repre­
sentatives. The system of article 113 has come off on nego­
tiations under other articles.
This practice has been contested in certain quarters. The 
fact that the Council and Member States attach great impor­
tance to this system was highlighted recently with regard 
to negotiations and consultations with third countries in 
fishery matters.
The present negotiation system is not in conformity with the 
Treaty, nor is it functioning as effectively and smoothly as 
it could. Member States are reluctant to surrender their 
external powers into new fields not expressly covered by the 
Treaty ("l'effet de freinage"). This fear is largely respon­
sible for Member States wishes to monitor closely the Com­
mission as spokesman in external affairs. Procedures taking 
account of Member States (and the Parliament's) interests 
have contributed to making action at Community level a cum­
bersome affair. (The task is not made easier by the general 





























































































Conversely, this has in certain cases affected Member States 
confidence in the ability of the Community to act appro­
priately on the international scene. Member States often 
fear that the Community is unable to react fast enough and 
that Community action, because of the transparency of pre­
parations, cannot guarantee the required confidentiality in 
negotiations.
To some extent it is a vicious circle. The guestion is where 
to break it.
II. International Relations of the Union.
1. General observations.
Title III of the Draft Treaty is devoted to the internatio­
nal relations of the Union. Apart from the seven articles in 
this chapter (articles 63-69), the Draft contains certain 
other provisions dealing wholly or in part with external 
affairs.
Thus, the fourth preambular paragraph reaffirms "the desire 
to contribute to the construction of an international 
society based on cooperation between peoples and between 
states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, security and 
the strengthening of international organizations".
A similar but not quite identical provision is found in 
Article 9, section 3. Section 2 and 4 also deal with objec­
tions concerning the international relations of the Union.
Furthermore, the following provisions contain particular 
references to the Union's external relations:





























































































- Article 6 on the legal personality of the Union;
- Article 7 on the Community patrimony, in particular para
4;
- Art 16 litra 1, Art 21 litra 2 and Article 28 litra 7 spe­
cifying the functions of the Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission respectively. The powers and functions of 
the European Council are specified in Title III.
The provisions of Title III, of course, have to be read in 
conjunction with the general rules of the Draft Treaty, in 
particular Part Two on the objectives, methods and competen­
ces of the Union, Part Three on the institutional Provisions 
and Part Four concerning Policies of the Union.
Compared with the present system the main feature of Title 
III, seen together with Article 7 para 4, is that EPC has 
been brought under the auspices of the Union. In principle, 
the distinction between Community and EPC-matters has been 
broken down. However, Title III is not limited to setting 
the objectives and competences in the external field; it 
also provides for methods among which some apparently are 
meant to take account of the sensitive and delicate charac­
ter of EPC-issues. As a general rule, EPC-matters are sub­
ject only to the method of cooperation. They may be trans­
ferred to the area of common action. However, Article 68 
para 2 and 3 contain special rules, derogating from the 
general system of the Draft Treaty and designed to introduce 
a special flexibility in the EPC-area. In general, the im- 
presion is that the authors of the Draft Treaty have attemp­
ted to preserve the EPC system at its present stage of evo­
lution when introducing it into the framework of the Treaty.
Finally, a word on the terminology used in this part of the 




























































































the principal notion. "External relations" is the label for 
international relations conducted by "common action", typi­
cally actions covered by present Community powers. "Foreign 
policy" is the term frequently applied to international 
relations conducted by "cooperation", as a general rule 
relations dealt with under EPC.
2. Objectives and the Treaty system of international 
relations.
Art 63 sets out the principles and objectives of the Union's 
international relations. Para 1 takes up and expands the 
language of preambular para 4 and Article 9. Seen as a 
whole, Art. 63 may to some extent be repetitive.
The express reference to Art 9 in para 2 introduces some 
uncertainty regarding the relationship between the two 
paragraphs of Art 63. Para 1 states that the "Union shall 
direct its effort in international relations towards the 
achievement of..." whereas para 2 says that the Union "shall 
endeavour to attain the objectives set out in Art 9". At the 
same time, para 1 contains objectives mentioned as well in 
Art 9, such as peace, détente, and improvement of interna- 
tional monetary relations. Conversely, the term "coopera­
tion" does not appear in para 1.
The methods (common action or cooperation) are only men­
tioned in para 2; it is not clear whether these methods also 
apply to attain the objectives of para 1. If so, it might 
help to introduce the last sentence of para 2 in a new 
separate para 3.
Apart from these more specific comments, it seems that the 
language of para 1 in certain respects is too specific and 




























































































Instead of "disarmament" (the term of Article 9) para 1 
refers to "mutual balanced and verifiable reduction of mili­
tary forces and armaments". This, of course, is one method 
of disarmament, in fact the one pursued presently by the 
Ten; but it need not be the only method and not necessarily 
the preferred method in the next decade.
The term "strengthening of international organization" does 
not strike the right note. All the Member States are pre­
sently devoted to very restrictive budget policies in nearly 
all international organizations. They are, as a general 
rule, committed to foreign policy guidelines aiming at 
avoiding the establishment of new international organiza­
tions unless they can be justified as absolutely necessary.
A term like "strengthening of international cooperation" 
might be more appropriate.
External actions of the Union are either common action or 
cooperation. The fields of cooperation may be transferred to 
common action (Art 68.2) and the fields of cooperation may 
be extended (Art 68.1).
Art 10 para 2 defining common actions specifies that they 
may be addressed inter alia "to States", a term which seems 
to encompass "third States". Other subjects of international 
law, such as international organizations, are not specifi­
cally mentioned as addressees.
In resume, the system may be described as follows;
Within the framework of common action the Commission is the 
Union-negotiator; guidelines are issued by the Council; the 
Parliament is kept informed at every stage and approves 
-together with the Council - international agreements.




























































































The Commission is the institution exercising the right of 
(active) legation (or representation) abroad.
3. Analysis of the operative provisions on international 
relations.
Article 64 para 1 seems to confirm the principle of paralle­
lism between internal and external Union powers. Thus, in 
its international relations, the Union shall act by common 
action in the fields referred to in this Treaty where it has 
exclusive or concurrent competence.
The question is how the concept of "common action" should be 
interpreted in the sense of Article 64 para 1. The provi­
sions of Art 10 para 2 define "common action" as all nor­
mative, administrative, financial and judicial acts, inter­
nal or international, issued by the Union itself, origina­
ting in its institutions etc. Art 12 para 2 provides that 
where the Treaty confers concurrent competence on the Union 
the Member States shall continue to act so long as the Union 
has not legislated. In this situation, it may be asked
whether Member States shall continue to act - also in the
4)external field.
Assuming that the Draft Treaty were based on the same system 
as the Treaty of Rome the situation with regard to external 
relations would be as follows:
If the institutions of the Union cannot arrive at a decision 
to act at Union level in cases where it has exclusive com­
petences the legal consequence is not that Member States may 
5 )act. If the competent institutions cannot act in areas
4) Para 4 of Article 64 concerns cases where the EC has 
exclusive competences which have not been fully exer­
cised and does not address this situation where there 
are concurrent competences.
5) It should not be excluded that the institutions of the 
Union, under certain conditions, might delegate the 




























































































where there are concurrent competences the legal consequence 
is that Member States may continue to act - of course, with 
respect of the provisions of Article 13.
This is one thesis which might well be advanced as an answer 
to our question. It is, at least, the result of a fair 
interpretation of Article 64 para 1 read in conjunction with 
Articles 10 and 12.
It is, however, not the result flowing from a reading of 
Article 65 which is built on the assumption that the Com­
mission is the sole representative of the Union in the exer­
cise of its competences, exclusive and concurrent.
The conflicting interpretations seem to stem from the fact
that Article 64 para 1 - perhaps inadvertently - has married
the issue of competences with the issue of the modalities
for their exercise. If so, it may be advisable to review
Article 64 para 1 in order to make the necessary choices and
6)clarify the situation.
We see no objection to a legal construct whereby the Union 
acts at the external level through the competent institu­
tions also in areas where no competence has been exercised
7)at the internal level. It might be argued that Article 64 
para 1 presupposes the adoption of an organic law concerning 
the operation of the Union's external actions - in the field 
of exclusive as well as concurrent competences.
6) See similar criticism in the paper of V. Constantinesco 
"La repartition des competences entre l'Union et les 
Etats Membres".
7) See Joseph Weiler in "The external legal relations of 
non-unitary actors: mixity and the federal principle" 
from "Mixed Agreements" edited by David O'Keefe and 





























































































In the meantime, it might be wise to adopt a pragmatic 
approach which ensures total parallelism between internal 
and external powers: where the competence is exclusive 
internally the Union is exclusively competent in the exter­
nal field; in areas of concurrent internal competence the 
Member States remain competent to act externally until the 
adoption of a law according to Article 12 para 2 in fine.
It follows from this scenario that mixed negotiations and 
mixed agreements cannot be avoided under the Draft Treaty. 
This is not necessarily to be regarded as an evil. Mixity, 
properly administered, offers flexible solutions in many 
situations.
The areas referred to in Article 64 para 1 are found mainly 
in Part Four of the Draft "The Policies of the Union". Since 
the provisions covering the various fields have been drafted 
essentially with a view to action within the Union they may 
give rise to some difficulties of interpretation when 
applied to international action. Indeed, it may create dif­
ficulties when a particular policy is applicable "within the 
Union", see Article 50 para 1.
One example may illustrate the problems which may be encoun­
tered. Environmental policy is dealt with in Article 59.
This provision is very general in certain regards and sur­
prisingly specific in other respects. It is not quite clear 
whether the list of special policies is exhaustive. Protec­
tion f.inst. of the marine environment is not mentioned in 
particular, and yet this is the field which has most often 
been the subject of negotiation of international agreements 
by the Community.
A solution may be sought through recourse to the general 
provision of para 4 of Article 64, which seems to encompass 




























































































established as well on the basis of article 235. This, 
however, would hardly be a legally secure solution.
Para 2 of Article 64 confirms in particular that commercial 
policy remains a field of exclusive competence. Whereas art 
113 of the Treaty of Rome contains certain contributions to 
the interpretation of the notion of commercial policy, the 
similar provision of the Draft is very lapidary.
Mr. Derek Prag's working document (Doc. 1-575/83/C p. 113) 
gives certain indications as to the intentions of the 
authors, but otherwise the text of the Draft is not very 
helpful. The present formula may, after all, be preferable 
in order to allow for a dynamic interpretation of "commer­
cial policy" based inter alia on the Community patrimony.
Development aid policy (DAP) referred to in para 3 of art.
64 is not defined f.inst. in relation to commercial policy.
The provision prescribes that during a transitional period 
of ten years DAP shall progressively become the subject of 
common action by the Union.
It is not entirely clear whether all aid, including aid 
granted by Member States, is to become the subject of the 
Union's DAP and thereby of common action. The last part of 
the paragraph seems to presuppose the continued co-existence 
of independent DAP programmes by Member States. This would 
be a flexible and wise solution. Recognizing the very impor­
tant internal policy factors underlying DAP in every Member 
State as well as the special ties that certain Member States 
entertain with particular developing countries it would 
hardly be realistic to expect any Member State to surrender 
all policy powers in this field.
The provision transferring the Union's DAP progressively to 




























































































be subject to exclusive or concurrent competence of the 
Union. This may, of course, become the subject of a special 
organic law. In any event, the scenario which may result 
from para 3 of Article 64 seems to be DAP within areas under 
exclusive as well as concurrent competence. In the latter 
fields, Member States may continue to act so long as the 
Union has not legislated. Furthermore, Member States pre­
serve the power to act under their independent programmes 
which shall be coordinated with the DAP of the Union. 
Finally, it cannot be excluded that certain political 
aspects of aid policy will be dealt with under cooperation.
Para 4 of Article 64 aims at situations where the exclusive 
competence of the European Communities has not yet been 
fully exercised. Indeed, it is true that in some cases under 
the common commercial policy the Community has not been able 
to act, f.inst. vis a vis certain Eastern European countries 
and the USSR. In other cases, f.inst. in relation to Japan, 
the inability to act seems due rather to opposition by 
Member States. While the exclusivity of Community competence 
in these cases is undisputed, at least in principle, there 
may be areas where the concept of "exclusive competence" is 
not subject,to unanimous interpretation by the Commission 
and Member States. The dispute relates inter alia to the 
preemptive effects of agreements concluded on the basis of 
ERTA plus Opinion 1/76 and perhaps also of Article 235.
This leads to an intricate question relating to the con­
tinued co-existence of art 235 of the Treaty of Rome and 
the provisions of the present Union Treaty which does not 
contain a similar provision (and perhaps does not need 
it). ' How would Article 235 operate in particular in rela­
tion to para 4 of article 64.?




























































































Article 65 contains the regime governing the conduct of com­
mon action. At first glance, it appears to reinforce the 
role of the Commission as the sole representative of the 
Union vis a vis the exterior. The new feature is the 
increased role of the EP. According to para 4 all inter­
national agreements shall be approved not only by the Coun­
cil but also by the EP.
The approach seems to reflect a praiseworthy attempt to 
balance the need of an effective regime against the need of 
observing certain basic democratic principles. The question 
is whether a reasonably balanced result has been found.
When considering the co-decision power of the EP with regard 
to all international agreements to be concluded by the 
Union it should be recalled that no Member State Parliament 
has such extensive powers. This, of course, should in itself 
be no excuse for not making the procedures of the Union more 
democratic. However, the Union is not based on a parliamen­
tary system; the Council is not politically responsible to 
EP. Consequently, it hardly seems justified, in principle, 
to grant such co-decision power to the EP.
In any event, it is difficult to understand why EP should 
have a co-approval power with regard to all international 
agreements without any discrimination. Many agreements do 
not deserve such treatment.
Moreover, the provisions of art 65 seem to exclude applica­
tion of the so-called simplified procedure whereby an agree­
ment may be concluded solely by signature of the Parties 
without subsequent ratification or approval.
Conversely, para 4 refers only to international agreements 
but not to other international acts (unilateral legal or 




























































































entailing legal obligations. It is not specified which 
institution approves such acts.
«
It might also be argued that some international actions do 
not even merit submission to the Council. There should be a 
subsidiary organ for handling current affairs, f.inst. 
COREPER which in spite of its very important role in actual 
practice is not even mentioned in the Draft.
Para 3 concerning information of EP does not define the term 
"every action". It may cover any action preparing for or 
being part of the negotiation phase. The term "every action" 
should, therefore, at least be made more specific in order 
to make sure that the confidentiality of negotiations is 
safeguarded.
Finally it is not made clear whether the Commission may take 
external initiatives without prior "authorization" by the 
Council.
In summary, the procedures laid down in Article 65 do not 
seem to offer an acceptable solution to the problems which 
face the Community as an international actor. On the 
contrary, Article 65 appears to have added further obstacles 
to the present cumbersome machinery. In particular, the co­
decision power of the EP goes further than necessary to 
safeguard the relevant democratic guarantees.
The following suggestions might serve to make the regime 
more acceptable. Firstly, it might be useful to codify the 
present practice of setting up a committee composed of 
representatives of Member States to assist the Commission 
during negotiations. Experience has shown that such a moni­





























































































Secondly it would probably be wise to couple the provisions 
of para 3 with a clause concerning the establishment of a 
permanent foreign relations committee of the EP authorized 
to receive information on actions in the field of interna­
tional relations. The Draft Treaty might also prescribe that 
the rules of procedure of this committee should contain cer­
tain provisions on confidentiality etc. This would be con­
sistent with present practice and might enhance the flow of 
information on international actions.
Thirdly, it might be appropriate - if the system of EP co­
approval is maintained - to limit the categories of inter­
national agreements subject to co-approval by the EP in 
order not to overload EP with technical agreements of minor 
importance. Various criteria might be applied. International 
agreements having financial implications or containing pro­
visions which would affect existing Union law or introducing 
new rules which - if made internally - would fall under the 
Articles concerning draft laws should always be subject to 
co-approval of the EP. Furthermore, the approval of the EP 
might be made subject to a silence procedure. In any case, 
there should be a special provision dealing with the 
situation where the EP - or the Council - fails to take a 
decision concerning the approval of an agreement.
Conversely, agreements dealing with subjects which otherwise 
would fall under the regulatory power of the Commission 
according to article 40 might be left for the Commission 
alone to negotiate and to conclude unless the Council deci­
des against with a qualified majority.
Article 66 and the following articles represent one of the 
major new features of the Draft Treaty: the inclusion of EPC 
into the Union System.
The question is what the Draft has achieved by this inclu­





























































































obstacles which so far have made Member States keep EPC out­
side the Community framework. Apparently, the Draft has 
adopted a very careful approach which attempts to codify the 
present state of evolution of EPC.
Article 66 defines the scope of cooperation. Contrary to the 
basic documents of EPC (the declarations of Luxembourg, 
Copenhagen, London, and Stuttgart) this article seeks to 
define more precisely the areas of political cooperation. 
Where EPC so far has progressed step by step, whenever and 
whereever it has been possible to obtain unanimity, within 
parameters defined as "all major policy questions of inte­
rest the Member States as a whole" the Draft Treaty attempts 
to establish a catalogue of areas inspired by the subsidia­
rity-principle. Apparently, the Union is not to have a 
foreign policy; the Union is rather intended to constitute 
a framework or forum for mandatory cooperation. By estab­
lishing a catalogue and by using a terminology, which is so 
wide and rather vague that it may embrace any foreign policy 
issue of concern to more than one Member State the Draft has 
adopted a maximalistic approach. Seen in conjunction with 
Article 68 there seem to be no limits as to what matters 
might come under cooperation. Under the present system EPC 
is governed by declarations of a political nature. According 
to the Draft EPC will be made the subject of a legal text in 
introduced by the mandatory words: "The Union shall conduct 
etc".
This leads to another question of principle, namely whether 
matters covered by cooperation fall under the competence of 
the Union or of Member States. The answer to this question 
is relevant f.inst. in relation to the role of the Court in 
the area of cooperation.
It seems to result from the provisions of Article 12 eo 




























































































tence. However, a simple reading of the provisions of 
Article 68 para 3 (i.e. "the European Council may decide to 
restore the fields transferred to common action either to 
cooperation or to the competence of the Member States") may 
lead to the conclusion that the areas covered by cooperation 
are neither under Member States competence.
According to the logic of the construct intended by the 
Draft it seems most reasonable to conceive matters of coope­
ration as falling under the competence of Member States. 
Otherwise, the provisions of Article 67 para 2-4 would not 
make sense. However, a problem arises if - as foreseen by 
para 1 of Article 67 - an action is to be implemented by the 
Commission. Is the Commission acting on behalf the Member 
States or on behalf of the Union by means of acts of the 
Union? In the latter case, the question is whether the mat­
ter is to be considered as transferred to Union competence 
at the stage of implementation.
If the Draft Treaty is to avoid the present problems rela­
ting to the complex interdependence of Community matters and 
EPC matters, f.inst. in the field of economic sanctions, it 
must be ensured that the management of political matters 
remain under cooperation, unless expressly transferred to 
the field of common action. The reason is that the voting 
rules will not be the same: Under cooperation they are like­
ly to be unanimity whereas common action will be governed by 
majority rules.
An example may illustrate the problem. Modifications of the 
rules on liberalization of trade in goods may be one of the 
instruments by which economic sanctions are introduced vis a 
vis a third country. These rules fall, as such, under common 
action but should if modified for foreign policy reasons be 
governed by the rules under cooperation unless the European 




























































































the Commission to implement these measures according to the 
rules on common action. If necessary, it should be possible 
to authorize one or more Member States to derogate from such 
measures. This would be in the spirit of the provision in 
Article 68 para 2 in fine.
Art 67 on the conduct of cooperation raises the question why 
cooperation as such is reserved for the European Council 
whereas the Council of the Union shall be responsible - 
only - for its conduct.
Experience from EPC has shown that cooperation is required
as a day-to-day affair and that - for practical reasons - it
must be delegated to a large extent to the level of
9)officials. Of course, the broad terms of Article 67 open 
the possibility for setting up a machinery similar to the 
present EPC-machinery in particular the Political Committee. 
Not that it should be imitated, but the right way of 
improving the present system would seem to be to build on 
the most successful features while keeping the basic EPC- 
patrimony intact.
Compared to the present EPC-system Art 67 contains a novelty 
by granting the Commission a right of initiative in the 
foreign policy field. This may be a controversial issue in 
many Member States. In any event, such a new task will ine­
vitably affect the organizational structure of the Commis­
sion. (A new General Directorate of Foreign Affairs?)
9) The Interim Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institu­
tional Affairs submitted to the European Council at its 
meeting in Dublin December, 1984, foresees a reduction 





























































































Paras 2 and 3 use the term "the Union" without specifying 
the competent institution. Otherwise, these provisions seem 
to contain a suficient degree of flexibility. The crux of 
the matter remains: What are the more precise parameters for 
cooperation and which is to be the decision-making rule of 
the European Council and of the Council of the Union when 
acting within the field of cooperation. ^
Para 4 preserves the valuable patrimony concerning the role 
of the Presidency.
Article 68 concerns extension of the field of cooperation 
and transfer from cooperation to common action. Para 1 men­
tions specifically as some of the new areas of cooperation, 
armaments, sales of arms to non-member states, defence 
policy and disarmament. Depending on the definition of 
"disarmament" it should be noted that disarmament-related 
issues are already subject to political cooperation among 
the Ten within the UN and CSCE. The objective "disarmament" 
is also mentioned in Article 9. Suffice it to say that the 
other matters, like defence policy, are highly controversial 
issues and that they will raise a host of questions as to 
the relationship be-tween the UNION and organizations like 
NATO and WEU of which most or some of the Member States are 
members. It will come to the surprise of nobody that men-
10) Another question is whether a Council of the Union com­
posed of ministers permanently and specifically respon­
sible for Union affairs, see Article 20, will be accept­
able as a forum for Cooperation matters, if these mini­
sters are not foreign ministers as well, f.inst. like in 





























































































tioning these subject matters is tantamount to waving the 
red rag in some capitals. At least, if there are no limits 
as to the matters which may become the subject of coopera­
tion - and subsequently of common action - the parliaments 
of Member States would be justified if criticizing the Draft 
for giving too extensive powers to the European Council.
Para 2 provides, as an exception, that the "veto-power" in 
questions of transfer of a field from cooperation to common 
action is preserved without any time limit. One might ques­
tion the need for this rule. Cooperation is the prerogative 
of the European Council; its decision-making procedures are 
not laid down in the Treaty but are to be determined by the 
institution itself, see Article 32 para 2. If unanimity is 
to be the "voting-rule", the practical need for a "veto- 
power" would be minimal, i.e. a constitutional guarantee in 
case the unanimity rule is amended.
The power to authorize one or more Member States to derogate 
from common action measures is a sound expression of prag­
matism. The constraints of article 35 do not apply as such, 
but the principles thereof should be borne in mind. This 
authorization would serve to legalize situations like those 
the Community has experienced in the field of sanctions, see 
above under II.
Para 3 contains a revolutionary provision of a heretical 
nature in a Community context. It allows for a reversal by 
empowering the European Council to decide to restore fields 
transferred to common action either to cooperation or to the 
competence of the Member States. Taking account of the very 
delicate fields found in the foreign policy arena the rule 
as such seems very useful; it allows for flexibility and 
balances to some extent the daring perspectives of para 1. 
The sentence "and in accordance with paragraph 2" does not 




























































































because para 2 refers to the whole of Article 11. The use of 
the veto-power in this situation does not seem to make sense 
either, unless para 3 is based on the philosoply that is 
important to make sure that there is permanent unanimity to 
maintain a certain field within common action and that lack 
of unanimity at a later stage should lead to restoring the 
field to cooperation.
The novelty of art 69 is that the Commission may represent 
the Union - and not only the institution as such - in third 
countries and international organizations. Art 69 deals with 
the socalled "droit de legation active" as distinct from the 
right of representation in international negotiations. It 
seems that a provision on "droit de legation passive" is 
missing, and that a clause to this effect might be useful.
In fact, this issue has been the subject of some controversy 
in the history of the Community.
The right of active representation is a prerogative of the 
Commission in matters subject to common action. In the 
fields of cooperation the task is shared with the Presiden­
cy's diplomatic agent.
* !4. Open issues
When looking at the present Community regime it should be 
noted that certain issues have not been taken up for express 
regulation in the Draft Treaty.
Since it cannot be ascertained by what kind of act inter­
national agreements are approved it is not possible to state 
whether the term "law" in Article 39 on publication could be 
interpreted to the effect that international agreements of 
the Union are to be published. Nor is there any provision 
concerning the registration of the Union's agreements with 




























































































said to flow from international law. However, since a spe­
cial system of registration has been established with regard 
to agreements concluded by entities like the European Com­
munity, it might be useful to insert a provision to this 
effect.
Considering the co-existence of art. 228 para 1(2) of the 
Treaty of Rome concerning the judicial review of the Court 
in the area of international agreements a special clause of 
a similar nature - which does not exist in the present Draft 
- may not be necessary. The question of introducing a better 
rule than Article 228 1(2) might, however, be considered.
The intricate legal question on the effects of international 
agreements in the Community/Union legal order has not been 
taken up and there may be several good reasons for leaving 
it to the jurisprudence of the Court. A rule like the provi­
sion of Article 228 para 2 might, in the event, be ajusted 
and inserted in the Draft.
Other problems which the Community has faced in practice 
relate to the right of representation of the Union in organs 
set up be mixed international agreement in particular if the 
agreement contains the traditional clause which does not 
allow two members of the same nationality. Furthermore, the 
voting right in international organizations has presented 
problems both in "mixed" and "pure" situations. The question 
is whether the general policy of the Union should be to 
strive for a number of votes cooresponding to the member of 
its Member States or only one vote. Legal and political 
arguments may be advanced for one or the other solution.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Draft Treaty 
clearly states (art 70 par 2) that common actions are, in 
the event, to be financed by the revenue of the Union.
The question concerning financing of measures taken within 






























































































The international relations regime of the Draft Treaty 
grosso modo, forms a logical and coherent system.
The main novelty compared to the present situation is the 
formal inclusion of the EPC into the Union-system. Efforts 
have apparently been deployed in order to ensure continuity 
and the largest possible extent of flexibility. The "flexi­
bility" regarding the definition of foreign policy areas 
under cooperation is, however, so great that it may prove 
counter-productive with a view to obtaining acceptance by 
Member States. Furthermore, the draft leaves open the cru­
cial question of the decision-making rule in the area of 
cooperation.
In the classical area of common action the Draft Treaty has 
built rather faithfully on the Community patrimony. However, 
the rules concerning the conduct of common action should be 
reviewed. The negotiation system would probably create more 
problems than it solves. It will be so heavy that this fac­
tor alone may deter Member States from "surrendering" exter­
nal powers to the Union. In particular, it would be diffi­
cult to justify the role of the EP to the extent foreseen by 
the Draft.
I
Finally, seen from the point of view of international rela­
tions it is hardly possible to conceive of a Union of less 
than all Member States. Indeed, the system of Art. 82 
allowing for a progressive creation of the Union could not 
be reconciled with the regime on international relations of 
the Draft Treaty. In any event, it has been difficult to 
mount the Community as an actor on the international scene 
and to explain its legal personality; it would be virtually 
impossible to explain the co-existence of a Union with a 
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